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169 
INMATES WHO CRIED WOLF: THE DANGERS 
OF APPLYING THE PLRA’S LIMIT ON 
APPELLATE ATTORNEY’S FEES IN PRISONER 
DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS CLAIMS 
“[E]ating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working, and playing are all 
done under the watchful eye of the State . . . . What for a private citizen 
would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his tailor, 
with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute 
with the State.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the incarceration rate in the United States 
began to skyrocket, increasing rapidly during the “War on Drugs” in the 
1980s and continuing to rise as states began to adopt three-strikes laws.
2 
The exponential increase in the prison population inevitably led to an 
increase in prisoner grievances.
3
 In 1995, the year prior to the passage of 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners filed 41,679 civil 
rights actions nationwide, more than double the number of such actions 
filed a decade earlier.
4
 Prisoner civil rights actions accounted for more 
than thirteen percent of all civil cases filed in the federal district courts,
5
 
and the estimated cost of inmate lawsuits totaled $81 million.
6
 Given the 
high frequency of prisoner civil rights claims as well as the escalating 
costs associated with prisoner litigation, lawmakers grew concerned that 
federal courts were being inundated with expensive cases that lacked 
merit.
7
 Members of Congress emphasized that “prisoner litigation does not 
operate in a vacuum,” but rather “tie[s] up the courts, waste[s] valuable 
legal resources, and affect[s] the quality of justice enjoyed by law-abiding 
 
 
 1. Marissa C.M. Doran, Note, Lawsuits as Information: Prisons, Courts, and a Troika Model of 
Petition Harms, 122 YALE L.J. 1024, 1055 (2013) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 
(1973)).  
 2. Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and Executive 
Power: Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 299 (2007) 
(citing Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal Legislation in Recent American Experience, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 323, 331–35 (2005)). 
 3. Id. (citing Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1586–87 (2003)).  
 4. Denise M. Pennick, Limitations on Relief: Prisoner Litigation, HAW. B.J., Sept. 1997, at 6 
(citing Leonidas Ralph Mecham, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE UNITED STATES CTS., Judicial Business of the 
United States Courts, REP. OF THE DIR. 139 (1995)). 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. at 6 (citing Jonathan Kerr, Pennsylvania: Bills Would Head Off Prisoner Lawsuits, June 
20, 1996 WEST’S LEGAL NEWS 5869, 1996 WL 336059). 
 7. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S14611-01 (1995).  
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citizens.”8 Lawmakers’ concerns intensified in light of the small fraction 
of meritorious inmate claims. The vast majority of inmates who file 
lawsuits ultimately fail to secure a favorable judgment,
9
 as the bulk of 
claims are later deemed frivolous.
10
  
In 1996, Congress hastily passed the PLRA following limited 
congressional debate.
11
 This Note examines a recent circuit split 
concerning one of the PLRA’s central provisions, a limitation on the 
amount of attorney’s fees which may be awarded for successful 
representation of an inmate. Part II outlines the development of the PLRA 
and the circumstances surrounding the pertinent legislative history. Part III 
discusses three germane provisions of the PLRA: (A) the requirement of 
exhausting alternative remedies prior to filing complaints, (B) the physical 
injury requirement, and (C) the limitation on attorney’s fees. Part IV 
analyzes a recent circuit split between the Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit 
over the application of the PLRA’s attorney’s fee cap when fees have been 
accumulated defending a judgment on appeal. Emphasis is placed on 
evaluating the Sixth Circuit’s and Ninth Circuit’s rationales for 
determining whether the cap on attorney’s fees applies to appellate fees in 
addition to fees accrued in order to secure an initial monetary judgment on 
behalf of a prisoner. Finally, this Note evaluates the practical and policy 
implications of interpreting the PLRA’s fee cap to limit an award of 
appellate fees, advocating for the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in Woods v. 
Carey.
12
  
 
 
 8. Id. (statement of Sen. Robert Dole). The record also highlighted that the National Association 
of Attorneys General estimated that prisoner civil rights actions cost the states in excess of $81 million 
each year, with the majority of expenses stemming from the defense of unfounded civil rights claims. 
Id.  
 9. See Eugene J. Kuzinski, Note, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous Inmate 
Litigation, Judicial Oversight, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 
364 (1998) (citing Review & Outlook: Criminal Oversight, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1996, at A18). 
Kuzinski went on to give the example of prisoner defendant Harry Franklin who had earned a 
reputation for frivolous claims with the court. Id. at 366 n.32 (“Chief Judge James Burns of the United 
States District Court in Oregon used this evocative language to introduce an opinion discussing inmate 
Harry Franklin . . . : ‘This is another chapter in the Harry Franklin saga. No longer am I tempted to call 
it the final chapter, as desirable as that would be to me. I mention mournfully that only the finality of 
death—his or mine—would enable the other of us to use the term ‘final’ in that way. And, of course, if 
mine comes first, I have no doubt that another judge will someday express lamentations such as these. 
They will be packaged and labelled, by reason of tradition, as opinions.’”) (quoting Franklin v. 
Oregon, 563 F. Supp. 1310, 1316 (D. Or. 1983), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Franklin v. 
Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 10. See id. at 364. 
 11. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Note, Low Riding, 110 YALE L.J. 1089, 1092 & n.21 (2001) 
(citing Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court 
in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1277 (1998)).   
 12. 722 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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II. LEGISLATORS RESPOND TO A RISE IN UNSUBSTANTIATED PRISONER 
COMPLAINTS 
In 1994, in response to a barrage of frivolous inmate court filings and 
the immense costs associated with hearing the claims, legislators began to 
rally support to adopt legislation aimed at deterring such litigation.
13
 
Strategically, legislators highlighted the most outrageous prisoner 
complaints in order to underscore the absurd, and at times, even comedic 
nature of the lawsuits: “America was warned, [prisoners] were bogging 
down the courts with abusive lawsuits.”14  
The legislative history of the PLRA provides a flavor of inmates’ 
purported injuries. In one case, an inmate sued for “$1 million in damages 
for civil rights violations because his ice cream had melted.”15 The court 
noted “that the right to eat ice cream was clearly not within the 
contemplation of our Nation’s forefathers.”16 In another case, “an inmate 
alleged that being forced to listen to” country music amounted to cruel and 
unusual punishment.
17
 One prisoner brought suit for damages because a 
piece of cake on his dinner tray was “hacked up” when it was served to 
him.
18
 Similarly, another inmate sued when “he was served chunky instead 
 
 
 13. See William C. Collins, Bumps in the Road to the Courthouse: The Supreme Court and the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 24 PACE L. REV. 651, 667 (2004) (“State attorney generals [sic] rushed 
out their ‘top ten frivolous litigation’ lists to support passage of what was to become known as the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act. California cited one example of an inmate who claimed prison officials 
had implanted an electronic device in his brain that controlled his thoughts which were then broadcast 
over the prison PA system. According to then Attorney General Dan Lungren, the Department had to 
prove it had not performed surgery on the inmate and submit a declaration that the prison did not have 
the electronic capability of broadcasting thoughts over the PA system.”) (internal citations omitted). 
However, not everyone was in agreement that the PLRA should have been adopted. Collins goes on to 
write that in response to the push for prisoner litigation reform through legislation which would deter 
lawsuits, “[t]he ACLU National Prison Project countered with its Top Ten Non-Frivolous Lawsuits 
list.” Id. (citing ACLU Nat’l Prison Project, The Top Ten Non-Frivolous Lawsuits Filed By Prisoners, 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OREGON, http://archive.acluor.org/archive/Leg_2005/pdf/Leg_ 
2005_HB2140_top10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8C47-7JR8). The list includes examples of 
sexual assault, flagrant prison guard brutality, and one instance of prison officials ignoring health 
safety warnings and “fail[ing] to implement basic tuberculosis detection and control procedures,” 
leading to the spread of tuberculosis to over 400 prisoners. Id. 
 14. Roger Roots, Of Prisoners and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: A Tale of Two Litigation Reform Efforts, 
38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 210, 210 (2002) (citing Rick M. Steinmann, Are Inmate Lawsuits Out of 
Control? Yes, in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS 239, 241 (Charles B. Fields ed., 1999)). 
Roots also points to a New York Times article in the time period prior to the passage of the PLRA 
which “warned the public that prisoners’ claims were ‘overwhelm[ing] state attorneys’ and ‘costing 
taxpayers millions in legal fees.’” Id. at 210–11 (citing Ashley Dunn, Flood of Prisoner Rights Suits 
Brings Effort to Limit Filings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1994, at A1, B4). 
 15. 142 CONG. REC. S3703-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Spencer Abraham).  
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
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of smooth peanut butter.”19 Aside from food-related injustices, one 
particularly trendy prisoner commenced litigation demanding LA Gear or 
Reebok Pumps instead of Converse tennis shoes while imprisoned.
20
 With 
such an outrageous list of extreme examples, lawmakers were able to 
gather support for legislative reform without dissent. Senator Spencer 
Abraham summarized, “These kinds of lawsuits are an enormous drain on 
the resources of our States and localities, resources that would be better 
spent incarcerating more dangerous offenders instead of being consumed 
in court battles without merit.”21 
III. THE ENACTMENT OF THE PLRA 
In 1996, Congress passed the PLRA “to reduce the burdens on the 
federal courts from what was perceived as a tidal wave of lawsuits—many 
of them frivolous—brought by imprisoned individuals.”22 Though 
advocates of the legislation touted the anticipated decrease in frivolous 
complaints due to the law’s stringent limitations on inmate access to the 
courts, the new law’s swift passage also received immediate criticism. For 
example, the PLRA has been disparaged as “being the result of a rushed 
enactment that was subject to little congressional debate,” sheepishly 
pushed through as a rider to an appropriations bill.
23 
Among the critics, 
“Senator Edward Kennedy complained that ‘[t]he PLRA was the subject 
of a single hearing in the Judiciary Committee, hardly the type of thorough 
review that a measure of this scope deserves.’”24 Rather than a fully vetted 
law, “[i]t has been described by Professors Mark Tushnet and Larry 
Yackle as a ‘symbolic statute’—one passed so that legislators [could] ‘tell 
their constituents that they [had] done something about a problem,’—but 
with all too ‘real consequences.’”25 
Despite the criticism, the PLRA aimed to reduce the amount of 
lawsuits filed by prisoners
26
 in several ways.
27
 In order to appreciate the 
 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Philip White, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Prison Litigation Reform 
Act—Supreme Court Cases, 51 A.L.R. FED. 2D 143 (2010).  
 23. Allison Cohn, Comment, Can $1 Buy Constitutionality?: The Effect of Nominal and Punitive 
Damages on the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical Injury Requirement, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
299, 305 (2006). 
 24. Id. (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S22, 96 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)). 
 25. Shay & Kalb, supra note 2, at 300 (quoting Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes 
and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prisoner 
Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–3, 85 (1997)). 
 26. For a discussion of whether the PLRA’s limitations should also apply to juvenile offenders, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/8
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full magnitude of the circuit split over the limitation on attorney’s fees, it 
is important to review the greater scheme of perhaps the most pertinent 
PLRA-initiated limitations on prisoner complaints, as well as how they 
mesh.  
A. Exhaustion Requirement 
First, the PLRA prohibits a prisoner from filing a lawsuit under 
§ 1983,
28
 a civil action for deprivation of rights, without first seeking other 
forms of redress.
29
 What has been referred to as the exhaustion 
requirement in the statute states that “[n]o action shall be brought with 
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are 
exhausted.”30 If a state has not adopted an administrative grievance 
procedure, the absence of such a process could be grounds for bringing a 
prisoner civil rights claim.
31
  
The exhaustion requirement’s scope is wide-ranging and has withstood 
challenges to its application. For example, in Porter v. Nussle, an inmate 
challenged the exhaustion requirement in his case in which he alleged 
excessive use of force by prison officials.
32
 The inmate argued that 
exhaustion should not be required when the alternative remedial process is 
controlled by the same prison officials who are accused of wrongdoing.
33
 
The Court disagreed, holding “the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies 
 
 
see Anna Rapa, Comment, One Brick Too Many: The Prison Litigation Reform Act as a Barrier to 
Legitimate Juvenile Lawsuits, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 263 (2006). Rapa argues that the PLRA 
should not apply to juveniles because “juveniles do not typically file frivolous lawsuits” and “juveniles 
are more vulnerable, less educated, and less able to advocate for themselves.” Id. at 265.  
 27. Aside from the PLRA’s attorney’s fees provision discussed below, the PLRA also attempts to 
limit the filing of pro se actions through the elimination of fee waivers: “Courts can no longer waive 
filing fees for indigent (i.e., almost all) inmates but now can only put the inmate on a monthly payment 
plan. Payment will be extracted from all funds that show up on an inmate’s account.” Collins, supra 
note 13, at 669 (internal citations omitted). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996).  
 30. Id.  
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b) (1996).  
 32. 534 U.S. 516, 519–20 (2002).  
 33. Id.  
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to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive 
force or some other wrong.”34 Thus, the exhaustion requirement must still 
be met despite prison officials’ disincentives to address grievances when 
they are the very agents causing a prisoner’s complaint.35 Prison power 
dynamics prove to be obstacles in fulfilling the exhaustion requirement 
because oftentimes inmate complaints must first be filtered through the 
personnel who are the alleged transgressors.
36
 
B. Physical Injury Requirement 
A second pertinent provision of the PLRA is the physical injury 
requirement. Section 1997e(e) provides that “[n]o Federal civil action may 
be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional 
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a 
prior showing of physical injury.”37 Like the exhaustion requirement, the 
physical injury requirement has also been criticized as overly restrictive.
38
 
“While the PLRA was enacted to limit the number of frivolous lawsuits 
. . . [it] has been applied to numerous constitutional torts that can hardly be 
deemed frivolous—infringement of the First Amendment right to free 
exercise of religion, violation of the constitutional right to privacy, [and] 
infliction of psychological torture . . . .”39 The distinction between physical 
and nonphysical injury is problematic because “[t]hese constitutional 
injuries are rarely accompanied by physical injury, yet are still 
fundamental rights protected under the Constitution.”40 Thus, one 
commentator has argued that drawing such a distinction creates an 
erroneous “hierarchy of injuries,” providing transgressors with immunity 
so long as no physical scars are left behind.
41
 “The result is that an 
attorney may only take on cases where the prisoner has been physically 
 
 
 34. Id. at 532.  
 35. See Shay & Kalb, supra note 2, at 319 (“The counter-productive result of such changes is 
that grievance systems become more technical and complex, and thus less likely to lead to the quick 
resolution of prisoners’ complaints—the ostensible purpose of the exhaustion requirement. Indeed, 
turning grievance procedures into a preliminary step in litigation could discourage officials from 
diligently investigating and resolving complaints, for fear of generating information that could increase 
their legal exposure. Under a procedural default regime, it is much safer to dispose of complaints with 
unassailable technical denials.”).  
 36. See id.  
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (1996).  
 38. See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 23. 
 39. Id. at 315 (internal citations omitted).  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/8
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injured, ignoring other constitutional cases that are just as meritorious and 
deserving of judicial attention.”42 
Moreover, the physical injury requirement’s restrictions specifically, 
and the PLRA provisions in their totality, have been criticized for 
weakening institutional and societal interests in maintaining the integrity 
of the justice system.
43
 While imprisonment may be viewed as a proper 
vehicle for retribution, the legitimacy of the prison system as a state 
institution is undercut when inmates are unlawfully abused. For example, 
Doran characterizes prison as “a managed environment[] in which 
prisoners’ lives may be entirely controlled by their captors.”44 Doran goes 
on to explain that “[i]n limiting prisoners’ ability to access the courts, the 
physical injury requirement interferes with the critical role played by 
lawsuits in facilitating the flow of information about prison life to the 
outside world.”45 With inmates’ hampered ability to communicate 
grievances, complaints are often stalled at the cell walls and inmates are 
again hindered in addressing potentially serious complaints.
46
 
C. Award of Attorney’s Fees 
Third, the most recent controversial way in which the PLRA seeks to 
deter the filing of frivolous prisoner civil rights claims is by placing a 
ceiling on the amount of attorney’s fees that may be recovered in 
connection with the representation of an inmate.
47
 A ‘prisoner’ is defined 
 
 
 42. Id. at 327.  
 43. See Doran, supra note 1, at 1055. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. For a discussion of the PLRA’s effects on diminishing inmates’ constitutional protections 
which have historically been upheld, see Cohn, supra note 23. Cohn underscores that inmate 
constitutional protections have been engrained in society notwithstanding incarceration: 
In Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court held that although incarceration necessarily causes citizens 
to lose many rights and privileges, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of all constitutional 
protection: “There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this 
country. Prisoners have been held to enjoy substantial religious freedom under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. They retain right of access to the courts. Prisoners are protected 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious 
discrimination based on race. Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Process 
Clause. They may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”  
Cohn, supra note 23, at 302 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (citations 
omitted)). 
 47. Section (d) of the PLRA provides, in relevant part:  
 (1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 of this title, 
such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that—(A) the fee was directly and 
reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights protected by a 
statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and(B)(i) the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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as any adult serving a prison sentence following a conviction, those who 
have been indicted but not convicted of a crime, as well as juveniles 
accused of delinquency.
48
 The PLRA’s mandated limitation on attorney’s 
fees contains a disputed proportionality requirement which seeks to ensure 
that fees are comparable to the award of damages in each case.
49
 The 
proportionality requirement restricts the hourly rate that can be used in 
determining the proper attorney’s fees to 150 percent of the rate lawyers 
defending indigent individuals facing federal criminal charges may 
receive.
50
 Interpretations of the scope of coverage of the PLRA’s 
attorney’s fees provision have differed among courts.  
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING WHETHER THE CAP ON ATTORNEY’S 
FEES APPLIES TO FEES ACCRUED DEFENDING A JUDGMENT ON APPEAL  
Two circuits have ruled on questions pertaining to the limitation of 
attorney’s fees in prisoner deprivation of rights actions under section 
1983.
51
 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations conflict as to whether 
the limitation applies only to fees accrued while successfully litigating an 
issue at the trial court level or whether the cap applies to all attorney’s 
fees, including fees incurred while defending a judgment on appeal.
52
 The 
Sixth Circuit was the first circuit to rule on the issue in 2004.   
 
 
amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or 
(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the 
violation. (2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph 
(1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount 
of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater 
than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.  
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d) (1996).  
 48. Lynn S. Branham, Toothless in Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act’s Disparate Restrictions on Attorney’s Fees, 89 CAL. L. REV. 999, 1007 (2001).  
 49. See id. at 1006.  
 50. Id. 
 51. For a discussion of the history of immunities and defenses to § 1983 claims, see Stephen W. 
Miller, Note, Rethinking Prisoner Litigation: Shifting from Qualified Immunity to a Good Faith 
Defense in § 1983 Prisoner Lawsuits, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 929, 933–34 (2009).  
 52. See Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2004) (Riley II); Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/8
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A. The Sixth Circuit Holds the PLRA’s Limit on Attorney’s Fees Applies 
to Fees Accrued Defending a Judgment on Appeal 
The correct calculation of appellate attorney’s fees under the PLRA 
became a contested issue in Riley v. Kurtz.
53
 In Riley, the plaintiff, an 
inmate, brought suit against a prison guard, alleging the guard illegally 
opened his mail outside of his presence in violation of his First 
Amendment rights.
54
 He also alleged that the guard created a false 
misconduct report against him in violation of his Eighth Amendment right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
55
 The inmate filed a 
complaint pro se, and the trial court appointed him counsel.
56
 The jury 
found in favor of the inmate on all of his claims and awarded the inmate 
approximately $25,000 in damages.
57
 The case was appealed to the Sixth 
Circuit where the court overturned the jury verdict in part.
58
 The court also 
remanded the inmate’s remaining claims for a new trial, but gave the 
inmate the option of a remittitur.
59
 After the inmate elected for the 
remittitur, the court reduced the award of damages to approximately 
$1,000.
60
  
The inmate’s attorney subsequently sought compensation for appellate 
fees totaling nearly $26,000
61
 pursuant to section 1988(b).
62
 Opposing the 
request for attorney’s fees, the defendant argued that $26,000 was an 
impermissible fee request under the PLRA given the reduction in the 
amount of damages to approximately $1,000.
63
 As to the appellate fees, 
the district court found that the PLRA does not limit the attorney’s 
appellate fees because, in part, “the PLRA does not apply to time spent by 
a prevailing prisoner plaintiff defending challenges of judgments by prison 
officials.”64  
 
 
 53. Riley II, 361 F.3d at 906. 
 54. Riley v. Kurtz, 194 F.3d 1313 (6th Cir. 1999) (Riley I).  
 55. Id.  
 56. Riley II, 361 F.3d at 910.  
 57. Id.   
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. “Traditionally, parties to litigation bear their own costs unless a specific statute or 
contractual provision provides otherwise. In 1976, the courts were given discretion to award a 
reasonable attorney’s fee to prevailing civil rights litigants.” Id. at 911 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 
U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992)). Moreover, “[a] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his 
claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s 
behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111–12. 
 63. Riley II, 361 F.3d at 910. 
 64. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
178 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:169 
 
 
 
 
Arguing that appellate fees too must be limited to 150 percent of the 
amount of a judgment awarded in favor of an inmate, the defendant 
contended that the inmate’s attorney was limited to a maximum of 
$1,504.50 in fees.
65
 The inmate’s attorney responded that “the PLRA does 
not limit his appellate fee request because the PLRA does not apply to 
appeals filed by the defendant.”66 The attorney also argued “that an appeal 
filed by a defendant is not an ‘action brought by a prisoner,’ that the 
limitation on attorney’s fees” would thus not apply, and that he was 
“entitled to the full amount of his requested appellate fees.”67 The Sixth 
Circuit ultimately held “that the PLRA applies to all the attorney’s fees 
generated by a prevailing prisoner—trial, post-trial, and on appeal.”68 The 
court’s rationale relied on statutory interpretation, legislative history 
analysis, and public policy concerns, explored below.  
1. The Sixth Circuit’s Statutory Interpretation Rationale 
The Sixth Circuit recognized that reasonable attorney’s fees may be 
awarded to prevailing prisoner civil rights litigants.
69
 In order to assess the 
appropriate amount of attorney’s fees, the court outlined the relevant 
provisions of the PLRA subject to interpretation. The first provision states 
that “[i]n any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, 
prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s fees are 
authorized under section 1988 of this title, such fees shall not be awarded” 
except under certain circumstances.
70
 Those circumstances include when 
the fee “was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual 
violation of the plaintiff’s rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a 
 
 
 65. Id. at 913.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 917.  
 69. Id. at 911 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1976)). Section 1988 provides guidance on attorney’s 
fees for proceedings in vindication of civil rights. It explains:  
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, 
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney’s fee as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer 
for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held 
liable for any costs, including attorney’s fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such 
officer’s jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 70. § 1997e(d), quoted in Riley II, 361 F.3d at 911. 
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fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and the amount of the 
fee is proportionally related to the court ordered relief for the 
violation.”71Alternatively, fees may be awarded if “the fee was directly 
and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.”72 
The statute goes on to provide that: 
Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described 
[above], a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall 
be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against 
the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 
percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.
73
 
This latter “portion of the PLRA has been interpreted to mean that an 
attorney’s compensation comes first from the damages (up to 25 percent), 
and then, if inadequate, the defendant is liable for attorney’s fees under 
[section] 1988 up to 150 percent of the monetary judgment.”74 
The defendant in Riley argued that based on the terms of the statute, the 
absence of an explicit exception to the 150 percent limitation for appellate 
fees meant no appellate fees should have been awarded.
75
 Implicitly, he 
also argued that the fee cap applies to all attorney’s fees, regardless of the 
time or phase of litigation.
76
 In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit keyed in on 
the phrase “in any action brought by a prisoner” within the PLRA.77 The 
court stated that “[t]he issue . . . is whether the appeal filed by the 
defendant is part of the original action, or if, as argued by [the inmate’s 
attorney], it is a completely separate action.”78 The court reasoned: 
There appears to be no reason why an appeal brought by the losing 
party should be considered anything other than a continuation of the 
original action. There is no final judgment or decree until the 
appeals process has ended. Therefore, we reject [the inmate’s 
attorney’s] first argument and find that an appeal filed by the 
defendant is part of the original action.
79
  
 
 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Riley II, 361 F.3d at 911. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
 77. The court stated that the term “action” is not defined in the statute, but noted that Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines it as “any judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a determination, will 
result in a judgment or decree.” Id. at 914 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 29 (7th ed. 1999)).  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
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Second, the court moved onto the portion of the statute authorizing 
attorney’s fees under section 1983 for the prevailing party in the lawsuit.80 
Here, the defendant argued that the legislative intent supported his theory 
that the fee cap equally applies to appellate fees, pointing to a report issued 
by the House Committee on the Judiciary concerning the PLRA’s 
attorney’s fees provision.81 The report put forth by the House Committee 
on the Judiciary dated February 6, 1995 (“House Report”) contained 
relevant proclamations with respect to the award of attorney’s fees. First, 
the House Report made explicit that the PLRA “permits prisoners 
challenging prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to receive attorney 
fees but reasonably limits the circumstances under which fees may be 
granted as well as the amount of the fees.”82  
The House Report goes on to explain several ways in which attorney’s 
fees are restricted, beginning with the interpretation of the definition of a 
prevailing party: “First, [the PLRA] narrows the judicially-created view of 
a ‘prevailing party’ so that a prisoner’s attorney will be reimbursed only 
for those fees reasonably and directly incurred in proving an actual 
violation of a federal right.”83 The objective was to narrow who qualifies 
as a prevailing party in order to “eliminate both attorney fees that penalize 
voluntary improvements in prison conditions and attorney fees incurred in 
litigating unsuccessful claims, regardless of whether they are related to 
meritorious claims.”84 Intended results were twofold: to “eliminate[] the 
financial incentive for prisoners to include numerous non-meritorious 
claims in sweeping institutional litigation,” and to “retain[] the financial 
incentive to bring lawsuits properly focused on prison conditions that 
actually violate federal law.”85 
Moreover, legislators factored in potential ulterior motives of attorneys 
who might seek excessive compensation through drawn-out litigation of 
unmeritorious inmate claims. For instance, the House Report highlighted 
the PLRA’s “effect of reducing attorney fee awards by eliminating fees for 
litigation other than that necessary to prove a violation of a federal right. 
This eliminates the financial incentive for attorneys to litigate ancillary 
 
 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 914 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104–21, at 28 (1995), reprinted in BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. 
& WILLIAM H. MANZ, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996 (1st 
vol., 1997)). 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
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matters, such as attorney fee petitions, and to seek extensive hearings on 
remedial schemes.”86  
Along the same lines, the proportionality requirement sought to ensure 
that any fees award was comparable to the amount of time and work put 
into an inmate’s representation.87 The House Report underscored, “This 
proportionality requirement will discourage burdensome litigation of 
insubstantial claims where the prisoner can establish a technical violation 
of a federal right but he suffered no real harm from the violation,” and 
“appropriately reminds courts that the size of the attorney fee award must 
not unreasonably exceed the damages awarded for the proven violation.”88 
The court reiterated that even a party that is only awarded nominal 
damages is nevertheless considered a prevailing party for purposes of the 
statute, and despite the fact that the plaintiff’s damages were limited, he 
was nevertheless a prevailing party because he succeeded on multiple 
claims of his lawsuit.
89
 However, the court recognized that the defendant’s 
legislative intent argument which limited the category of who qualifies as 
a prevailing party had merit, and shifted its analysis to the PLRA’s 
proportionality requirement.
90
  
With respect to the statute’s proportionality requirement and whether 
attorney’s fees for appellate work may be awarded at all, the court focused 
on the PLRA’s provision stating that “[a] prisoner may only qualify for 
attorney’s fees under the PLRA if the fees were ‘directly and reasonably 
incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights and if the fee 
is proportional to the amount of damages awarded for the violation.’”91 
The defendant argued that to defend a judgment on appeal is not the 
equivalent of “proving an actual violation,” and therefore the plaintiff’s 
attorney should not recover for appellate attorney’s fees.92 In determining 
whether appellate work constituted work to prove an actual violation, the 
court looked to case law for guidance.
93
 The court concluded that no 
 
 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 915 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104–21, at 28 (1995)). 
 89. Id. at 914.  
 90. Id. at 915.  
 91. Id. at 915 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A)–(B) (1996)). 
 92. Id.  
 93. The only analogous case the Sixth Circuit noted was Sallier v. Scott, a district court case in 
the Eastern District of Michigan. Id. at 916 (citing Sallier v. Scott, 151 F. Supp. 2d 836 (E.D. Mich. 
2001). Sallier concerned  
[W]hether the post-judgment work done by the prisoner’s attorney included “proving” a 
violation. Based on the definition of “prove” in Black’s Law Dictionary (to establish or make 
certain), the district court found that “hours spent defending the jury award against the 
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law may also be considered hours spent to 
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provision in the PLRA explicitly contravenes other case law holding that 
reasonable appellate fees may be granted for a prevailing party.
94
 Thus, the 
court found that attorney’s fees for appellate work may be awarded to a 
prevailing party under the PLRA, though subject to the PLRA’s 
proportionality requirement.
95
 The proportionality requirement, the court 
reasoned, applies to all fees, and thus the PLRA’s 150 percent limitation 
would apply to all fees as well.
96
 
2. Legislative Purpose Rationale 
Following its statutory interpretation, the court reasoned that a 
limitation on appellate attorney’s fees was necessary to carry out 
congressional intent in enacting the PLRA. The court stated, “[o]ne of 
Congress’ purposes in passing the PLRA was to reduce the large number 
of frivolous prisoner lawsuits being filed in federal courts.
97
 The fee cap 
provisions are directly related to this purpose.”98 Additionally, the court 
reasoned that “the fee cap could ‘counter-balance’ a prisoner’s numerous 
incentives to litigate and place prisoners and non-prisoners in a similar 
decision-making position.”99  
Describing the equitable result of limiting attorney’s fees, the court 
opined, “Just as a non-prisoner civil rights litigant should consider all the 
costs of bringing the action, including appellate costs, so should a prisoner 
litigant. . . . [T]he fee cap provisions are rationally related to protecting the 
federal and state treasuries.”100 The court relied on the rationale of Sixth 
Circuit precedent as well, noting “the twin goals of decreasing marginal 
lawsuits and protecting the public fisc are legitimate government interests, 
and . . . decreasing an attorney fee award in the context of prisoner civil 
rights litigation serves both of these interests.”101  
 
 
‘make certain’ the verdict.” 
 Id. (quoting Sallier, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 838–39) (internal citations omitted). 
 94. Id. at 915. The Sixth Circuit looked to case law for guidance on this issue of first impression. 
Id. The court noted that “[s]hortly after the enactment of § 1988, the courts interpreted its provisions as 
including awards for fees earned for the successful defense of a judgment on appeal.” Id. (citing Hutto 
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693–698 (1979); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979); 
Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 2000)).  
 95. Id. at 917.  
 96. Id. at 918.  
 97. Id. at 917. In contrast, the inmate’s attorney argued that “once a prisoner has prevailed at the 
trial level, the claims can no longer be considered frivolous.” Id.  
 98. Id.; see Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing 141 CONG. REC. S7498–
01 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole)). 
 99. Riley II, 361 F.3d at 917 (quoting Hadix, 230 F.3d at 845).  
 100. Id. (citing Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 669 (6th Cir. 2001); Hadix, 230 F.3d at 845). 
 101. Id. (quoting Walker, 257 F.3d at 669). 
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3. Public Policy Rationale 
Third, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that placing a limitation on all 
attorney’s fees furthers important public policy goals. The inmate’s 
attorney’s main public policy argument contesting that the PLRA’s fee 
limitation should apply to appellate work centered on the potentially 
deleterious incentives that would be created by such a rule.
102
 He argued 
that if the limitation on attorney’s fees applied to appellate work, a prison 
official who was accused of a civil rights violation would not be deterred 
from filing an appeal, even if the appeal lacked merit.
103
 This, in turn, 
would cause an inmate’s attorney to expend numerous billable hours 
preparing to defend a judgment on appeal, but that work would go 
uncompensated.
104
  
However, the court analogized the situation of an attorney choosing to 
represent a prisoner in a civil rights action and potentially defending a 
judgment on appeal to an attorney operating on a contingency fee basis.
105
 
The court stated, “[t]he possibility of having to defend a favorable 
judgment on appeal is just another factor a prisoner’s lawyer has to take 
into account in deciding whether to take the prisoner’s case in the first 
place.”106 The court again injected principles of equity into its analysis to 
reason that attorneys must consider whether to take on a prisoner civil 
rights claim by weighing factors as they would when representing 
plaintiffs in cases where the fee structure creates a possibility of zero 
compensation.
107
 
B. The Ninth Circuit Holds the PLRA’s Limit on Attorney’s Fees Does Not 
Apply to Fees Accrued Defending a Judgment on Appeal 
In Woods v. Cary, the Ninth Circuit was recently confronted with the 
same issue of whether the PLRA’s limitation on attorney’s fees applies to 
 
 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. For a differing point of view, see Schlanger, supra note 3, at 1656. Schlanger argues that 
the parallel to attorneys who operate on a contingency fee basis is flawed when used in connection 
with prisoner civil rights litigation. She writes, “[O]rdinary contingency-fee economics do not work 
very well for inmates, at least for prison inmates. First, inmates typically receive low damages even for 
serious injuries.” Id. She goes on to explain that “contingency-fee lawyers usually count on a good 
portion of their cases settling; if every case went to trial, plaintiffs’ lawyers would require far higher 
fees, at least for low-damages cases.” Id. 
 106. Riley II, 361 F.3d at 917.  
 107. See id.  
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appellate fees.
108
 An inmate, Woods, brought an action pro se against a 
prison appeals coordinator for a violation of his Eighth Amendment right 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
109
 He alleged that the 
coordinator repeatedly screened out his medical grievances, thereby 
causing him prolonged pain and suffering because he was prevented from 
seeking medical attention to fix his broken dentures.
110
 At trial, the jury 
found in favor of Woods and awarded him $1,500 in compensatory and 
punitive damages.
111
 On appeal, Woods was represented by counsel, and 
the judgment in his favor was affirmed.
112
 Woods then filed a timely 
motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $16,800 and $521.09 for costs 
under section 1988(b).
113
  
In response to the motion for attorney’s fees, the defendant argued that 
he was only required to pay $2,250, equal to 150 percent of the judgment, 
because the PLRA’s limit on attorney’s fees also applies to fees 
accumulated while defending a monetary judgment on appeal.
114
 The 
defendant’s argument was consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Riley; however, as a case of first impression in the Ninth Circuit, the court 
held that “the fee cap in § (d)(2) does not apply to attorney’s fees earned in 
conjunction with an appeal in which prison officials seek unsuccessfully to 
reverse a verdict obtained by the prisoner before the district court.”115 By 
ruling that the PLRA’s limitation on attorney’s fees does not apply to fees 
accrued while defending a judgment on appeal, the Ninth Circuit created a 
circuit split with the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the PLRA. The Ninth 
Circuit reasoned that statutory interpretation, legislative intent, and sound 
public policy support the conclusion that the PLRA’s cap on attorney’s 
fees only applies to fees accumulated while securing an initial monetary 
judgment.  
1. Statutory Interpretation 
First, the court engaged in a statutory interpretation analysis, beginning 
with a reading of the PLRA’s fee cap provision in light of its plain 
 
 
 108. 722 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 1180. In Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held 
that the PLRA’s limitation on attorney’s fees only applies to monetary damages, and not to attorney’s 
fees accumulated in the course of seeking injunctive relief. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1179.  
 115. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1184. 
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meaning.
116
 According to the court, the relevant statutory language is 
ambiguous.
117
 “The section states: ‘Whenever a monetary judgment is 
awarded in an action [the fee cap shall be applicable].’”118 The court 
determined that the statutory language could be interpreted in two ways. 
Either the fee cap applies to attorney’s fees awarded only in conjunction 
with obtaining a monetary judgment, a single occurrence throughout a 
lawsuit, or the fee cap applies to any attorney’s fees awarded throughout 
the course of a lawsuit in which a monetary judgment has been awarded.
119
 
After considering the two options in light of the statutory ambiguity, 
the court chose the first alternative, reasoning that “[t]hroughout the 
course of an action, courts may award fees on multiple occasions, but only 
the district court awards ‘a monetary judgment’ and then only on one 
occasion—either after summary judgment or after a verdict in the 
prisoner's favor.”120 The Ninth Circuit analogized to its prior opinion in 
Dannenberg, finding that just as it would be inconsistent with section 
(d)(1) to limit the award of attorney’s fees in an action seeking injunctive 
relief, it would also be a mistake to apply the limitation to the appellate 
work aimed at ensuring a judgment or verdict is not overturned.
121
 
Additionally, the court reasoned that “the statute uses the present tense—
‘[w]henever a monetary judgment is awarded’—meaning the point in the 
course of an action at which the monetary judgment is awarded, rather 
than in any case in which a monetary judgment has been awarded.”122 For 
the court, the use of the present tense reinforced its finding that the fee cap 
applies only to attorney’s fees accrued in connection with the initial award 
of a monetary judgment.
123
 
2. Legislative Purpose Rationale 
Next, the Ninth Circuit justified its holding by concluding that placing 
the fee limitation only on those fees accrued to secure a monetary 
judgment furthers congressional intent. Importantly, the court first 
 
 
 116. Id. at 1181. While the majority in Woods found that the PLRA’s statutory language with 
respect to the limitation on attorney’s fees was ambiguous, the dissent disagreed. Judge Murguia 
argued for the dissent that the fee cap provision is not ambiguous, that the plain meaning of the text 
should have been dispositive, and that the plain meaning requires a finding that the fee cap also applies 
to fees accrued while defending a judgment on appeal. Id. at 1184–85 (Murguia, J., dissenting).  
 117. Id. at 1181. 
 118. Id. (alteration in original). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 1182 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2)).  
 121. Id. (citing Dannenberg v. Valdez, 338 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2003)).  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
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reasoned that its holding would further the purposes of the PLRA because 
“it ensures that prisoners who have prevailed on a constitutional claim 
before the district court will not lose the relief that they have been awarded 
because they cannot secure counsel on appeal.”124 The court distinguished 
between legislators’ objectives in deterring frivolous prisoner complaints 
and prisoner complaints which progressed to the appeals stage.
125
 The 
Ninth Circuit explained that “Congress did not . . . intend to discourage the 
collection of awards in those comparatively few meritorious cases in 
which the district court had found that the prisoner’s constitutional rights 
had been violated and that the prisoner was entitled to collect damages for 
that violation.”126  
In addition, the court reasoned that the PLRA’s objective to deter 
prisoners from initiating burdensome and unfounded claims is not 
undercut when the fee limitation does not apply to an attorney’s appellate 
fees because the appeal is not initiated by the prisoner.
127
 Positions are 
reversed as the defending prison official files the appeal, and the prisoner 
is required to defend the judgment if she hopes to preserve it.
128
 There is 
no indication that the PLRA was meant to shield prison officials who have 
had verdicts entered against them in their attempts to appeal while placing 
prisoners at a disadvantage during the appeals process. The Ninth Circuit 
found that “[w]hile Congress meant to discourage the filing of § 1983 
claims . . . , it did not seek to compel those comparatively few prisoners 
with meritorious claims to forfeit their monetary awards by rendering the 
prisoners unable to secure counsel to defend the judgment.”129 
Finally, The Ninth Circuit reasoned that its opinion would promote 
 
 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. The court stated that “Congress enacted the PLRA to deter frivolous prisoner lawsuits that 
needlessly wasted judicial resources and to provide for their dismissal at an early stage.” Id. (citing 
Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 1999); 141 CONG. REC. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 
1995)). However, since “a substantial portion of the judiciary’s costs related to these types of cases is 
incurred in the initial filing and review stage prior to any dismissal,” the legislative intent to limit 
attorney’s fees would not apply to the few meritorious prisoner complaints that had garnered a 
judgment or verdict and advanced to the appeals stage of litigation. Id. (quoting Judicial Impact Office, 
Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995, H.R. 667 (1995)).  
 126. Id. The need to preserve the relatively few meritorious cases cannot be overstated. See Roots, 
supra note 14, at 222. Roots underscores the fact that “modern prison administration does not provide 
any real guarantee that the worst abuses in America’s prisons are a thing of the past.” Roots, supra, at 
222. Roots goes on to state that “[t]he limitation of access to the courts by pro se inmates poses serious 
threats that unconstitutional prison conditions will go unremedied . . . . In the worst cases of prison 
maladministration, prison officials have been known to subvert such processes entirely, discarding 
inmate complaints and illegally punishing inmates who complain.” Roots, supra, at 222. 
 127. Woods, 722 F.3d at 1183. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
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judicial economy.
130
 The court noted that preserving an option to award an 
attorney’s appellate fees would deter baseless appeals of judgments 
favoring inmates.
131
 The court reasoned, “[i]f we were to hold to the 
contrary, defendants would always have an incentive to appeal monetary 
judgments in the prisoners’ favor . . . . Such unnecessary appeals 
needlessly burden the judicial system—the exact opposite of Congress’ 
goal in enacting the PLRA.”132  
3. Public Policy Consequences of the Statutory Cap on Attorney’s Fees 
The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that applying an absolute limitation on 
attorney’s fees, including fees accrued while defending a judgment on 
appeal, would have harmful public policy repercussions. Highlighting the 
potentially high impact of successful prisoner civil rights claims, the court 
noted, “[t]he majority of these actions result in low-damage awards for the 
prisoner, but can affect substantial change in the prison conditions or 
prisoner treatment.”133 Limiting appellate attorney’s fees discourages 
inmates from seeking legal redress for grievances by creating “an effective 
barrier to accessing the legal system.”134 Such a barrier is created because 
“[a]lthough these fee restrictions are not as burdensome as the strict 
exhaustion requirements embodied in the PLRA,
 
they significantly limit 
the incentives of inmates and attorneys to litigate.”135 Moreover, rather 
than deterring frivolous prisoner complaints in their totality, the PLRA’s 
limitations only increase the number of pro se litigants
136
 while decreasing 
the number of attorneys willing to represent inmates.
137
  
 
 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 1182. The Ninth Circuit also pointed out the relatively limited reach of its holding 
given the small number of prisoner complaints which make it to the appellate stage. See id. at 1182 
n.5. 
 134. Walker Newell, An Irrational Oversight: Applying the PLRA’s Fee Restrictions to Collateral 
Prisoner Litigation, 15 CUNY L. REV. 53, 57 (2011). 
 135. Id. 
 136. While many pro se actions are swiftly dismissed, it is not unheard of that an action brought 
pro se can effect real change. For a comprehensive discussion of one such instance, see Collins, supra 
note 13, at 670 (citing STEVE J. MARTIN & SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, TEXAS PRISONS—THE WALLS 
CAME TUMBLING DOWN (1987)). The article recounts that “[w]hile most inmate lawsuits result in 
nothing for the inmate, some of the most significant litigation began as pro se complaints.” Id. The 
book traces the story of “the almost never-ending Ruiz case in Texas that remade the entire Texas 
correctional system [and] began as pro se complaints. So it can be presumed that some cases that 
inmates now don’t file have merit at the ‘reform’ level . . . and eventually result in some form of 
significant change.” Id. 
 137. See Schlanger, supra note 3, at 1655. In Inmate Litigation, the author conducted interviews 
with several jail supervisors and other officials familiar with prison conditions. In one interview on the 
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V. PROPOSAL 
The Ninth Circuit’s rationale for applying the PLRA’s attorney’s fee 
limitation to monetary judgments secured at the trial court level, and its 
recognition of the dangers of extending the fee cap to appellate work, is 
persuasive in light of the statutory language, legislative history of the 
PLRA, and public policy considerations.  
A. Statutory Language 
As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the statutory language of the PLRA is 
ambiguous with respect to whether appellate attorney’s fees are also 
subject to the 150 percent limitation.
138
 The Sixth Circuit’s approach reads 
into the statute a limit on appellate fees when such a limit is not explicit. 
For example, it is logical that “[i]f Congress had intended attorney’s fees 
for an entire monetary case to be limited to 150% of that judgment, it 
would have used language to dictate such. Congress could have stated that 
‘all’ fees are limited to 150% of any monetary judgment.”139 The PLRA’s 
fee cap provision does not specifically address the distinction between fees 
accrued while securing a monetary judgment and fees accrued defending a 
judgment on appeal. Thus, the statutory uncertainty necessitates further 
inquiry into Congress’ goals in enacting the PLRA.  
B. Legislative History 
Given that the statutory language is ambiguous as to whether the 
proportionality requirement is meant to be imposed on attorney’s fees 
accumulated while defending a monetary judgment on appeal, the 
 
 
perceived effects of the PLRA, the jail supervisor stated that the primary effect of the PLRA has been 
the increase in the number of cases with pro se inmate plaintiffs, making cases “easier to defend.” Id.  
 138. See Woods, 722 F.3d 1177; see also Erica M. Eisinger et al., Prisoners’ Rights, 52 WAYNE  
L. REV. 857, 914 (2006). The authors of Prisoners’ Rights criticize the Sixth Circuit rationale: “[i]n 
Riley v. Kurtz, a Sixth Circuit panel ignored the statutory language and legislative history of the PLRA 
in holding that the hours spent defending against an unsuccessful appeal of a monetary judgment 
against prison staff could not be greater than 150% of that judgment.” Eisinger, supra at 914. 
 139. Eisinger, supra note 138, at 919–20. Relatedly, Congress arguably would have been much 
more explicit in designating the fee cap to apply not only to a monetary judgment, but to appellate fees 
if that was the intention. As Eisinger et al. argue: 
If Congress had intended § 1997e(d)(2) to apply to fees awarded by district and appellate 
courts, it would have used different language. Congress could have replaced ‘a’ with ‘any,’ 
and its intent to apply subsection (d)(2) to all awards of attorney’s fees, including trial and 
appellate, would have been clear. Thus, subsection (d)(2) would have then read: “Whenever 
any monetary judgment is awarded.”  
Id. at 919. 
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legislative history and potential policy implications are also especially 
significant to a court’s determination of whether to adopt the Sixth Circuit 
approach or the Ninth Circuit approach. In that regard, the Ninth Circuit’s 
rule achieves an even balance between the primary purposes of Congress 
in enacting the PLRA and deterring a deluge of unmeritorious prisoner 
actions masked as legitimate deprivation of rights claims.  
Take, for example, a case in which an inmate brings a legitimate claim 
for a constitutional violation. A blanket limitation on the award of 
attorney’s fees would not achieve the goals enumerated prior to the 
enactment of the PLRA. “Nowhere in the Legislative History of the PLRA 
is there an expressed intent to impose restrictions on appellate fees where a 
jury has determined the prisoner’s lawsuit is nonfrivolous and awards 
damages.”140 A disconnect exists between the legislative intent and actual 
consequences of the fee restriction when adopting the Sixth Circuit 
approach because of the categorical limit on appellate fees even when the 
inmate’s claim is legitimate. Importantly, “There is no mention in the 
PLRA’s Legislative History concerning abuses that prevailing prisoners 
inflicted on the appellate courts in defending against appeals by losing 
defendants.”141  
 
 
 140. Id. at 920 (citing BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. & WILLIAM H. MANZ, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1996 (1st ed. 1997)). 
 141. Id. at 920 n.362 (citing Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“[P]rison 
staff argued that when both an injunction and money damages are awarded that the prisoner can never 
receive more than 150% of the monetary judgment.”). Eisinger points out that “[i]n rejecting this 
argument, the Ninth Circuit stated ‘[n]othing in the text or history of the PLRA supports a rule that 
would impose such a Hobson’s choice on prison inmates.’” Id. 
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C. Public Policy Implications and Collateral Effects 
The potential deleterious effects of placing a fee cap on appellate work 
completed on behalf of inmates who bring the rare meritorious claims 
which succeed at the trial court level are alarming. As the Ninth Circuit 
pointed out, once a prisoner has proceeded past the mountain of 
preliminary hurdles imposed by the PLRA and garnered a favorable 
judgment, it is unlikely that the claim lacks any merit.
142
 Imposing the 
PLRA’s attorney’s fee limitation at the appellate level would thus act as an 
unintended deterrent for attorneys defending meritorious prisoner claims 
that can potentially have a great impact on raising the level of care at 
prisons and holding prison officials accountable for flagrant violations.  
The Ninth Circuit’s rationale is also persuasive when viewing the 
attorney’s fee limitation in context with the numerous additional 
restrictions the PLRA places on inmates, discussed above.
143
 For example, 
“[w]hile it is true that the fee cap provision does not make it impossible in 
all cases for a prisoner to obtain legal services, the provision does destroy 
a critical incentive for lawyers to take on prisoner constitutional tort cases, 
thereby creating an additional impediment on the prisoner . . . .”144 
For those attorneys who persevere despite the knowledge of the limit 
on the fees they will recover, the limitation is also likely to diminish the 
strength of representation because of the decreased motivation knowing no 
(or very limited) fees will be accrued regardless of the outcome of the 
case.
145
  
When attorneys refrain from representing inmates in connection with 
their constitutional claims, the repercussions are discouraging. One 
potential consequence is that the grievance goes unaddressed when an 
inmate decides not to file the complaint without counsel.
146
 “While this 
may seem to be exactly what Congress desired in enacting the PLRA, 
Congress’s express intention was to limit the amount of frivolous lawsuits 
while leaving the courts open to prisoners with sincere allegations of 
constitutional violations.”147 At the other end of the spectrum, rather than 
 
 
 142. See Woods, 722 F.3d at 1182; see also Schlanger, supra note 3, at 1697 (“Whether by 
legislation or by other court policy, it would be a very useful change to have many more lawyers in the 
component of the inmate docket that survives summary judgment. This would tend to increase the 
settlement rate (reducing the litigation burden) and also make the trials far more accurate adjudicatory 
events.”). 
 143. See supra Part III.  
 144. Cohn, supra note 23, at 326–27.  
 145. Id. at 327.  
 146. See id. at 327.  
 147. Id. (citations omitted).  
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failing to file claims altogether, more persistent inmates will likely 
proceed with lawsuits pro se.
148
 “While pro se plaintiffs are held to less 
demanding pleading standards and do occasionally achieve success, the 
vast majority of pro se lawsuits fail.”149 Unsurprisingly, prisoners have 
historically had much greater success with the representation of counsel, 
underscoring the severity of the potential deterrent effect of limiting 
attorney’s fees.150  
Though one of the primary goals of the PLRA and the attorney’s fee 
provision was to free up the courts from painstaking and protracted 
litigation, the rise in the number of pro se litigants achieves the opposite 
effect:
151
 “If without counsel, [prisoners] litigate untrained in procedure 
and suspicious of the judicial system.”152 Also, “[p]rison administrators, 
the usual defendants in these actions, are often too busy keeping a lid on 
their underfinanced and volatile institutions to litigate responsively to 
court deadlines.”153 Thus, while limiting attorney’s fees is meant to sustain 
judicial economy, the PLRA provision creates additional burdens on the 
court and prison officials alike. This situation also highlights the power 
imbalance in inmate litigation when plaintiffs proceed pro se against the 
government.
154
 “[Prison officials] are represented by attorneys general 
who may defend through ‘papering’ the plaintiff and the court with 
motions. The burden of sorting through the unprofessional pleadings of the 
plaintiff and the dilatory pleadings of the defendant falls upon the court, 
slowing the litigation process to a halt.”155 Ironically, rather than freeing 
the courts from the barrage of prisoner complaints in order to allocate 
resources elsewhere, the fee cap motivates tactical procedures which are 
just as likely to obstruct the court system.
156
  
 
 
 148. See id. at 327–28.  
 149. Id. (citing Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2000)) (“While pro se litigants are not 
exempt from procedural rules, courts are solicitous of the obstacles that they face. Consequently, 
courts hold pro se pleadings to less demanding standards than those drafted by lawyers.”). 
 150. Id. at 327–28. 
 151. See id. at 328 (“Lawsuits brought pro se are not, and should not be, a preferred method of 
litigating constitutional violations, particularly as pro se litigation has the effect of substantially 
slowing the litigation process.”). 
 152. Id. (quoting Herbert Eastman, Draining the Swamp: An Examination of Judicial and 
Congressional Policies to Limit Prisoner Litigation, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 64, 70–71 (1988)).  
 153. Id. (quoting Eastman, supra note 152). 
 154. See id.  
 155. Id. (quoting Eastman, supra note 152). 
 156. See id. at 327–28.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It may be difficult to sympathize with attorneys who are unable to 
collect higher fees or feel compassion for the inmate population. Thus, at 
first glance, the PLRA’s limitation on attorney’s fees to 150 percent of a 
monetary judgment secured on behalf of a prisoner may not garner much 
attention. However, in the larger scheme of the PLRA, there is much to 
worry about. 
The prisoner complaints highlighted prior to the enactment of the 
PLRA included a lengthy list of the most frivolous actions, and rallying 
support for legislation that would seemingly free the court system from a 
shower of unmeritorious lawsuits was not very difficult. Underscoring the 
extremely frivolous cases in which inmates cried wolf, legislators were of 
the opinion that the court should no longer listen. With the support of the 
media’s attention on the most ridiculous claims, Congress swiftly passed 
the PLRA with little consideration of its future implications. While on its 
own the fee limitation provision may seem inconsequential, given the 
totality of the restrictions placed on prisoners by way of the exhaustion 
requirement and the physical injury requirement, the limitation on 
attorney’s fees becomes increasingly important to an inmate population 
which already faces a mountain of hurdles in order to have its grievances 
heard. 
The recent circuit split between the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
is thus one with enormous import. When an inmate is defending a 
judgment on appeal, the claim cannot reasonably be referred to as 
frivolous any longer. In fact, those claims are the few meritorious cases in 
which the fee limitation was never meant to apply. Thus, by taking the 
position of the Ninth Circuit and eliminating the restriction on appellate 
attorney’s fees, courts will more effectively balance the competing 
interests of inmates with legitimate grievances and the judiciary’s interest 
in eliminating needless litigation motivated by the quality of prison meals 
and brands of tennis shoes.  
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